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Giving Consumers a Political Voice
Organized Consumerism and the Belgian Welfare State, 1957-1981
giselle nath
Immediately after the Second World War, the word ‘consumer’ was an ill-defined 
signifier. By the early eighties, citizens’ interests were often routinely equated with 
consumer interests. We can attribute this in no small amount to the rise of consumer 
movements, who published comparative tests in monthly periodicals. These private 
organizations became the proverbial ‘consumer trade unions’: they drew attention to 
the producer consumer-cleavage and raised consumer awareness. In Belgium there 
were two separate consumer movements. Test-Achats (1957-present) promoted 
individual foresight as the best strategy for consumer protection. The working-class 
Union Féminine pour l’Information et la Défense du Consommateur (hereafter ufidec, 
1959-1984) was an organization led by social-democratic women. ufidec demanded 
more legal solutions from consumers and believed in strong collective action.
This article investigates how and why consumer organizations gained influence 
and legitimacy within the welfare state. The government initially rebuffed 
organized consumerism, only to accommodate it somewhat after the oil crisis in 
1973. However, if institutions (or proposed institutions) for consumer politics in 
Belgium remained relatively weak or ineffective, it was because they represented a 
compromise between a civil society intent upon its own survival, and a government 
more than willing to let consumers fend for themselves.
Een politieke stem voor de consument: consumentenbewegingen en de Belgische 
welvaartsstaat, 1957-1981
Hoewel het woord consument (of verbruiker) onmiddellijk na de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog een neologisme was, werd het tegen het einde van de jaren
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tachtig een stevig ingeburgerde term. Dit is onder andere te danken aan de 
opkomst van de consumentenbeweging. Deze private organisaties, die vooral 
vergelijkende warentesten publiceerden, fungeerden als consumentenvakbonden. 
Ze wezen op de tegengestelde belangen van producenten en consumenten 
en zorgden voor een groter consumentenbewustzijn. België kende zelfs twee 
verbruikersorganisaties: terwijl Test-Aankoop (1957-heden) individuele voorzorg 
promootte als de beste vorm van consumentenbescherming, bepleitte de Union 
Féminine pour l’Information et la Défense du Consommateur (ufidec, 1959-1984) meer 
wettelijke bescherming. ufidec profileerde zichzelf duidelijk als een organisatie 
voor en door de arbeidersklasse. De sociaal-democratische vrouwengroepen die 
ufidec ondersteunden, geloofden dan ook in sterke collectieve actie. Dit artikel 
onderzoekt hoe en waarom deze bewegingen in de welvaartsstaat invloed en 
legitimiteit verkregen. De Belgische overheid was aanvankelijk sceptisch ten 
opzichte van de georganiseerde consumentenbeweging, maar kwam deze na 
de oliecrisis in 1973 wel enigszins tegemoet. Toch bleven de instellingen die het 
consumentenbelang moesten verdedigen relatief zwak. Dit is te wijten aan een 
moeizaam compromis tussen sociale bewegingen die zichzelf in stand wilden 
houden, en een overheid die liever niet te veel intervenieerde.
The study of welfare state policies, much indebted to Esping-Anderson’s notion 
of the decommodification of labour, has not given much attention to organizations 
focusing on the quality and price of commodified goods. Consequently, the 
historiography of the welfare state in the Low Countries focuses mostly on the 
negotiations about social security and industrial relations.1 Even when it comes 
to consumerist themes like the cost-of-living index, trade unions and employer 
federations are regarded as the main actors.2
This scholarly bias is all the more odd because the birth of mass 
consumer movements coincided with the establishment of strong Keynesian 
welfare states. Most Western consumer movements were set up in the fifties. 
At their peak in the late sixties, it is estimated that one in three Belgian 
households had a subscription to a consumer advice periodical.3 Much 
1 D. Luyten and G. Vanthemsche, Het sociaal 
pact van 1944: oorsprong, betekenis en gevolgen 
(Brussels 1995); D. Luyten, Sociaal-economisch 
overleg in België sedert 1918 (Brussels 1995) 
and A. Meynen, ‘De economische en sociale 
problematiek sinds de jaren vijftig’, in: E. Witte 
e.a., Politieke geschiedenis van België van 1830 tot 
heden (Antwerpen 1997) 285-354.
2 P. Scholliers, Loonindexering en sociale vrede. 
Koopkracht en klassenstrijd in België tijdens het 
interbellum (Brussels 1985). On the role of 
government, see G. Vercauteren, In naam van 
de sociale vooruitgang: de rol van de overheid in 
het sociaal overleg in België, 1944-1981 (Leuven 
2007).
3 P. Claeys, Groupes de pression en Belgique: 
les groupes intermédiaires socio-économiques. 
Contribution à l’analyse comparative (Brussels 
1973) 259. This figure was a combination of 
subscribers to Test-Achats, ufidec and the older 
Family League, which had gradually begun to 
define family interests as consumer interests.
the rise of consumer society
like the architects of welfare states, consumer activists were committed to 
stable mass markets that offered all citizens a comfortable standard of living 
and qualitative household durables. These private publishers became the 
proverbial ‘consumer trade unions’. A study of their political heritage is long 
overdue.4 Organized consumerism drew attention to the diverging interests 
of consumers and producers, thereby creating a new political cleavage. Among 
their readers, consumer magazines also helped to shape consumer attitudes 
and reinforce certain product standards. Researching their impact can enrich 
our understanding of the welfare state beyond the traditional scopes of labour 
market regulation, social security and so forth. How were new demands 
for risk protection institutionalized? Which groups gained access to and 
bargaining power within the welfare state?
Recent works by Daunton and Hilton, Cohen and Black have begun 
to explore the connection between mass consumption and postwar political 
culture.5 Specifically, Hilton and Cohen have argued that a period of intense 
‘consumer democracy’ was followed by a more neoliberal regime that reduced 
the consumer interest to individual choice.6 This article wants to go one step 
further by looking not so much at political culture, but at specific welfare state 
institutions that gave consumers a political voice. By doing so, it will become 
clear that there were a number of turning points, rather than one abrupt 
transition towards neoliberalism. Moreover, in some respects, this turn towards 
individualism was already present within the consumer movement itself.
In Belgium, a delicate mix of public and private strategies was used to 
protect consumers from the excesses of the free market. Private organizations 
basically provided education, presented themselves as an insurance against 
bad purchases, and served as gatekeepers for consumer complaints. Public 
authorities usually only took measures if and when lobbied by consumer 
organizations. Economic crises often provided political opportunities for 
advancing the consumer cause.
4 Research on the political impact of consumer 
movements in Belgium has up until now only 
been undertaken by master students, or results 
from commemorative efforts by the consumer 
movement itself. See for instance M. Driesen 
Vivec, 1959-1984 (unpublished ma-thesis Vrije 
Universiteit Brussels 2014) and G. Vanwichelen, 
Kritische doorlichting en evaluatie van de 
consumentenbeweging (unpublished ma-thesis 
University of Leuven 1987). For the Netherlands, 
see J. Van Merriënboer “De moeizame start van de 
Consumentenbond.” Politieke Opstellen Centrum 
voor Parlementaire Geschiedenis 18 (1998) 53-69.
5 M. Hilton and M. Daunton (eds.) The Politics of 
Consumption. Material Culture and Citizenship 
in Europe and America. (Oxford 2001); L.Cohen, 
A Consumers Republic. The Politics of Mass 
Consumption in Postwar America (New York 2003) 
and L. Black Redefining British Politics: Culture, 
Consumerism and Participation (Basingstoke  
2010).
6 M. Hilton ‘Consumers and the State since the 
Second World War’, The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 611:1  
(May 2007) 78 and L. Cohen, A Consumers 
Republic.
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While measures of consumer protection have indeed multiplied 
and continue to do so at a European level, it seems that the momentum 
for involving consumers within economic planning was soon squashed in 
Belgium.7 During the golden sixties, many activists and subscribers believed 
in a tight nexus between consumer and citizen: the consumer interest was 
the citizen interest. By the late seventies and eighties, the consumer interest 
was just another special interest. The political voice of the consumer was by 
then relevant to the process of shopping in the market, but no longer to the 
regulation of the political economy.8
How can this be explained? One could argue that in a neo-corporatist 
welfare state such as Belgium, there was too little room left for consumer 
activists. Unions and employers had already carved out a central position 
for themselves, which consumer movements have never had.9 There is some 
empirical evidence for this argument, evidence which I will discuss more in 
depth below. However, I would also argue that the privatization of consumer 
action was a deliberate strategy of one specific type of consumer movement.
Especially when subscribing to the so-called ‘Anglo-Saxon model’ of 
the non-political comparative testing movement, some consumer activists 
did not seem to expect much from the state on ideological grounds. Their 
main angle was facilitating a truly informed individual choice, which in turn 
strengthened the invisible hand of the market. Later on, public measures 
were seen by these activists as a form of competition, and hence as a potential 
deathly blow to the sale of consumer periodicals. The comparative testing 
movement depends on subscriptions, not only to sustain the organization 
but also to afford lobby activities and wages for an increasing number of 
technically educated staff. While they are formally non-profit organizations, 
they are not free from commercial motives.
Ultimately, consumer protection is a political and not a strictly 
technical issue. In Belgium, both ideological motives and profit incentives 
were particularly strong in the consumer scene. Consumerism became locked 
in an already fierce competition between different political movements (or 
‘pillars’). This intense competition further threatened the financial basis of 
these organizations, which was initially quite precarious.
This unique character of Belgian consumerism becomes all the more 
obvious when we make the comparison to other Western countries. Norway 
and Sweden, where public consumer bodies were active, have had consistent 
7 This shift from the national to the European level 
was also analyzed by contemporaries. See for 
instance J. Poelmans L’Europe et les consommateurs 
(Paris 1978).
8 On the regulation concept see R. Boyer, La théorie 
de la régulation: une analyse critique (Paris 1986).
9 A. Siaroff, ‘Corporatism in 24 industrial 
democracies: meaning and measurement’, 
European Journal of Political Research 36 (1999) 166. 
doi:10.1023/A:1007048820297.
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consumerist policies and high levels of consumer protection. In Germany, 
consumerist groups coexisted rather harmoniously with a public foundation 
that publishes tests (the so-called Stiftung Warentest). Achievements in for 
instance the usa, France, the Netherlands or the United Kingdom were more 
modest and often fleeting in nature.10 However, in most of these countries as 
well, large private comparative testing movements supported interventionist 
policies. They were prepared to collaborate with governments from an early 
phase. The Belgian approach to consumer protection was quite different due 
to the intense politicization of the issue.
This article first discusses the foundation of two opposing consumer 
movements and the political context in which this happened. It then goes 
on to give a chronological overview of organized consumerism within 
the welfare state. During the sixties, the Belgian government first took 
note of the consumer interest. However, the newly established Council for 
Consumer Affairs paid little more than lip service. The energy crisis of 1973 
led to a second phase, during which consumer movements became more 
self-conscious and the authorities more involved. However, a new public 
institution called the Centre de Recherche et d’Information pour les Organisations des 
Consommateurs (hereafter crioc) soon found itself paralyzed by the mutual 
fear among the technocratic consumerists. In a final phase, starting in the 
mid-seventies, the Belgian consumer movement Test-Achats (hereafter ta) 
launched some ambitious ideas for consumer welfare, which sidestepped their 
traditional action repertoire. The final turn towards privatization of consumer 
defense should be understood as a result of the failure of these new proposals. 
Above all, the Belgian case illustrates the crucial role of ideology in defining the 
outcomes of welfare state policies, even in matters that seem purely technical.
Children of the cold war: Belgian consumer movements between market and state
The postwar market was initially very much a sellers’ market, controlled by 
producers. Government regulations were limited, and pertained mostly to 
basic food staples. This brought new risks for consumers, such as unlabeled 
or unhealthy pre-packaged foodstuffs, new medicines marketed through 
new forms of ‘scientific’ advertising and consumer credit rackets. Protective 
goggles for so-called harmful television beams were on sale and the indoor 
sunbed was presented as a good way to enjoy family time with the children.11 
Moreover, purchasing power in Western Europe was in general still quite low. 
This was perceived by the American diplomacy as a threat to Europe’s political 
10 G. Trumbull, Consumer capitalism: politics, product 
markets and firm strategy in France and Germany 
(New York 2006).
11 Test-Achats (May 1966).
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stability. American Marshall aid provided a window of opportunity to address 
some of these issues. 
us diplomats hoped to transform Europe into a more productive 
buyers’ market – and a common market for consumer goods at that. us 
diplomacy also had the example of the American Consumers Union (hereafter 
cu) back home. They enthusiastically began to diffuse what they called 
‘the cu model’ across Europe. While European consumer co-operatives had 
always stressed that consumption could be used to advance the working-
class interest, the Americans launched a more technocratic solution: buying 
responsibly and intelligently. Engineers and laboratory staff were seen as the 
ideal consumer defenders.
In 1954, the Dutch were the first Europeans to undertake a so-called 
productivity mission to the United States devoted to the consumer interest. 
Benjamin Buitendijk of the newly formed Consumentenbond participated, 
as did members of the co-operatives and the Dutch Household Council.12 
In Belgium, family organizations and the female branches of the social-
democratic movement had interest in the topic too. When the Belgians 
organized a study mission on consumerism to the Netherlands in 1958, all 
stakeholders agreed that a public umbrella organization for consumers, with 
the private organizations as board members, would be the best solution.13
However, resistance by the retail sector was particularly strong. 
The projected National Center for the Consumer, which would have been 
sponsored by the Belgian government for up to one million Francs, never 
became a reality.14 Those interested in organized consumerism soon set up 
their own organizations. Test-Achats and the Union Féminine pour la Défense et 
l’Information du Consommateur (hereafter ufidec) were founded respectively in 
1957 and 1959.
ta’s founder, Louis Darms, was an advertiser with good connections 
among the conservative wing of the Catholic Party. ta consistently promoted 
individual foresight as the best strategy for consumer protection, and there 
was even a hint of anti-communism in its insistence that co-operatives, 
working-class organizations or progressives could never be ‘neutral’ consumer 
defenders. However, ta’s founder succeeded in attracting broad layers of 
the establishment, academics and the upper middle class to his project. 
ta published a high-brow magazine which initially featured complicated 
technical jargon rather than radical political demands. ta also took pride 
12 Contactgroep Opvoering Productiviteit, Welvaart 
en Konsumptie. Rapport Consumer Interest Team 
(The Hague 1954) 11.
13 Office Belge pour l’accroissement de la 
Productivité, Verdediging der verbruikersbelangen. 
Belgische zending naar Nederland 18-21 Februari 1958 
(Brussels 1958), 19-35.
14 Algemeen Rijksarchief, Brussel (hereafter ara), 
Office Belge pour l’accroissement de la Productivité 
(hereafter obap), 169, Productivité commerciale: 
programme 14 mars 1959, 2.
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in following the Anglo-Saxon tradition, which they defined as liberal, non-
political and individualist.15
ufidec was an organization of social-democratic women. ufidec 
demanded more legal solutions for consumers and believed in strong 
collective action. ufidec felt that while cu did good work, a comparative 
testing organization had to be a movement rather than a company. ufidec 
recruited its rank-and-file by conviction, strong local networks and 
through artisanal propaganda. Rather than advertising the savings that 
subscribers could make, ufidec attracted members on the promise of political 
emancipation and social justice. A subscription to ufidec’s magazine was also 
significantly cheaper than one for ta.
While the trivialities of testing peanut butter do not suggest it, 
consumer activists faced fundamental questions. Were commodification and 
commercialization neutral processes, which only had consequences on the 
micro-level of the household? Or could they cause inequalities, which had to 
be kept in check by public authorities? ta chose the former position, thereby 
continuing the catholic preference for individual responsibility, market-based 
solutions and a non-interventionist state.16 Its choice for education over 
protest was remarkably coherent with the Catholic and liberal approaches to 
social politics. In contrast, ufidec of course saw the world according to the 
latter paradigm. It was more interested in mobilizing the state for consumer 
protection, if need be by boycotts and collective action.17
For instance, ufidec’s first media scoop was a law proposal on food 
safety. Shortly after that, ta made headlines by revealing that the ‘Russian’ 
seca brand of gasoline offered the same quality as other brands but at a 
significantly lower price.18 ta thus stressed the individual gains that could 
be made from following their advices, rather than collective solutions to the 
failures of the market. Later on, ufidec advanced the Swedish legislation on 
product labeling as an example, while ta believed that assertive consumers 
could defend their own interests.19 After simultaneously revealing mass 
fraud with bread weights in 1977, ufidec filed a complaint in court whereas 
ta stated that it was skeptical about the efficiency of controls by a public 
administration. ta consistently advocated self-defense:
15 Test-Achats (September 1968, editorial).
16 Test-Achats (January 1966, Les associations des 
consommateurs refusent l’étatisation): ‘we hold 
this principal as essential, that consumer action 
must come spontaneous’.
17 G. Vanwichelen, Kritische doorlichting en evaluatie 
van de consumentenbeweging, 28.
18 W. Van Rijckeghem, L’histoire de Test-Achats. 
D’une revue de consommateurs à une multinationale 
(Brussels 2005) 44.
19 Amsab-Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis 
(hereafter Amsab), Archives of the Cooperative 
Women, board meeting 25 January 1963 and 
4 December 1961 and C. Matton, La défense des 
consommateurs en Belgique de 1957 à 1984: ufidec 
et Test-Achats (unpublished ma-thesis, Vrije 
Universiteit Brussels 2005) 140.
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the consumer must be very specific about which type of bread he wants to buy, 
he must be attentive to the price and weight. If he determines abuse, he must 
alert the baker. If the bakers repeat the offense, ta recommends finding a new 
baker.20
If ufidec was quite open about its social-democratic inspiration (which 
should not be mistaken for blind allegiance), ta was less transparent. ta 
consistently couched its ideological choices in a discourse of scientific 
objectivity and efficiency. By presenting itself as a neutral guardian of 
the marketplace, its preference for private as opposed to public solutions 
remained somewhat veiled. ta rarely reflected on the consequences of its 
political message or its limited social impact. Nor could it clarify how the 
different parameters of the consumer interest (safety, labour conditions, 
sustainability and so forth) could be calculated ‘objectively’.
Initially, both movements had ambitious plans. They hoped to set 
up local clubs (which, in the case of ufidec were already in place), deliver 
education in schools, negotiate with governments over legislation and offer 
customized judicial assistance.21 Lack of resources soon forced them to 
limit themselves to publishing a (bi-)monthly publication. The magazines 
discussed good and bad shopping habits, results of comparative tests and the 
general consumer interest.
Still, getting the financial resources to pay for the expensive testing 
procedures was a perennial problem that plagued ta during its first decade 
and eventually led to the dissolution of ufidec in 1984, when the social-
democratic womens’ organizations no longer had enough money to support it. 
ufidec’s definition of the consumer interest was predominantly informed by 
the everyday experience of poverty and more austere in tone. Underfinanced, 
understaffed, often cautionary and repetitive, ufidec struggled to accept that 
postwar consumer society comprised more than food safety. While calling for 
legal injunctions and contrasting Western affluence to the poverty of the Third 
World, ufidec lacked the means to expand its message.
One of the most important factors in ufidec’s decline however, was 
the lack of human capital. ta was led by higher educated, male technicians, 
mostly from a well-heeled background. As economists, professors or 
engineers, their voices were perceived as more authoritative than those of the 
stagnating social-democratic women’s associations. As working-class women 
who ideologically opposed commercialism, ufidec’s rank-and-file lacked 
the connections or means to launch certain political proposals or sell the 
organization in a fashionable way. Moreover, marginalizing ufidec’s political 
20 ‘Mouvements des consommateurs’. In Courrier 
Hebdomadaire du Centre de Recherche et 
d’information socio-politiques [hereafter crisp] 33 
(1977) 15.
21 Test-Achats (January 1977, republishing of the 
original Bulletin de Liason de Test-Achats).
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project had literally become a matter of life and death for ta. It accrued profits 
to hire new, professionally trained staff while ufidec had a small staff and 
a lot of volunteers. This imbalance will emerge clearly in the proposals for 
giving consumers a political voice. ta, much more vocal and dynamic than 
ufidec, usually played the dominant part in these negotiations.
The Belgian council for consumer affairs (1964-1973): containing the consumer
While organized consumerism was struggling to collect resources, it was 
easy to ignore it. But by 1963, consumer movements had gained some public 
legitimacy. The country was moreover troubled by a rising cost-of-living index 
and tensions between labour and capital.22 One of the solutions proposed 
by social-democrat minister of Economy Antoon Spinoy was to reform and 
broaden the process of social-economic concertation. Spinoy envisioned a 
merger of the two main neo-corporatist bodies to discuss both social and 
economic aspects of regulations in the same arena.23 His plans would also 
allow the incorporation of other stakeholders (e.g. farmers or consumers) in 
the regulation of the political economy.
Vercauteren and Wijnens have analyzed how Spinoy’s proposals for 
a unified Social-Economic council met resistance and eventually failure.24 
The foundation of a separate Council for Consumer Affairs was a direct 
consequence of this failure. It kept the dream of broadened concertation alive 
without stepping on sensitive toes.
The Council for Consumer Affairs25 was eventually established in 
February 1964 within the Ministry of Economic Affairs. This was the first 
public recognition of the consumer-producer cleavage as a phenomenon that 
deserved sustained political attention. Compared to other European countries, 
this recognition came fairly late.26 By 1955, the Dutch government had for 
instance already united all stakeholders in the consultative Consumenten 
Contact Orgaan (ccc).
22 T. Luyckx, Politieke geschiedenis van België 
(Amsterdam 1978) 513.
23 I refer to the Central Economic Council (Centrale 
Raad voor het Bedrijfsleven) and the National 
Labour Council (Nationale Arbeidsraad).
24 The result was not a merger but a new separate 
council with less power. G. Vercauteren and 
I. Wijnens ‘Een  twee-eiige tweeling? De 
institutionele scheiding tussen het federale 
‘sociale’ en het ‘economische’ overleg 
(1944-1983), Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste 
Geschiedenis 34 (2004) 231-287.
25 This is my own translation for what is known in 
Dutch as Raad voor Verbruik.
26 Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, 
Austria, West-Germany and the United 
Kingdom all set up councils on household 
consumption and consumer defense, either 
ad hoc or structurally. Amsab, Archives of the 
Cooperative Women, report 18 March 1958 and 
M. Hilton Consumerism in Twentieth-Century 
Britain. The Search for a Historical Movement 
(Cambridge 2003) 220.
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The Belgian Council was however not a direct channel between 
government and consumer representatives but rather a roundtable for 
oppositional groups. Consumer advocates were included alongside producers, 
retailers and ‘independent’ experts. Yet in contrast to other tri-partisan 
bodies, the council had no regulatory powers whatsoever apart from offering 
advices.27 As a result, consumers gained a political voice in the side issues, not 
the essentials.
There was moreover a tremendous gap between the ideal and the 
practice of consultation. Since unanimous advices were almost never given, 
the Council lacked the credibility that discouraged ministers from ‘burying 
the advices in cardboard boxes within the ministry’.28 The Council did not 
have any real funding or staff to investigate specific topics.29 Cooperation with 
the department of Economic Affairs left much to be desired. To order books 
and documentation, Council members had to fill out several slips. It took 
three months to procure the large-sized envelopes to send out the first Council 
reports, while typing assignments were sloppily executed.30
The weak status of the Council was attributed to sustained protest 
of trade unions and employers.31 But perhaps policy-makers were blaming 
others for hindering a job they were not really prepared to take up 
themselves.32 Public declarations on the need for consumer protection – even 
those by social-democratic politicians – always used commonplace arguments 
such as the haste of modern life or a broadening of consumer choice.33 But the 
cases on which the Council worked basically dealt with the abuse of economic 
power and serious legislative gaps. Welfare state involvement meant hurting 
interests and possibly rethinking values that had only just been established 
as core of the welfare state: productivity, economic development and full 
employment policies. Consumer problems were not just the result of the 
‘haste of modern life’: they were caused by producers and retailers.
Still, unions and employers clearly did not want to see their power 
dissipate in favour of another interest group. When consumer movements 
were founded in Belgium and the Netherlands, they created a scandal among 
27 E.g. the commission that supervised prices or 
the tripartite Control Committee for Gas and 
Electricity. See E. Witte and A. Meynen, België na 
1945 (Antwerpen 2006) 379.
28 Amsab, Société Générale Coopérative 
(hereafter sgc) 9582 and 9584, Le Conseil de la 
Consommation, Council Meeting 2 June 1967 and 
3 April 1968.
29 Amsab, sgc, 9584, 4 February 1970.
30 Amsab, sgc, 9580 Council meeting, 9 November 
1967.
31 Amsab, sgc, 9580 Council meeting, 9 November 
1967.
32 While the Belgian minister of Public Health 
condemned the use of citric acid in beer, he 
allowed the repletion of existing stocks. L. Darms 
‘Le malaise consommateur’ La Revue Nouvelle, 15 
September 1962.
33 Amsab, sgc, 9577, Parole de Simonet, cabinet of 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs 1964.
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business communities. Companies sued them because they were given bad 
ratings or denied a right to answer – even if such a response consisted of barely 
concealed advertising.
Consumer organizations also posed a challenge to the trade unions. 
Especially the social-democratic white-collar trade union bttk reacted stung. 
While bttk recognized the legitimacy of consumer concerns, it expressed a 
low esteem for the new consumer spokesmen, particularly the more liberal-
minded ta and its founder, the technocratic advertiser. In bttk’s viewpoint, 
the ‘non-political’ Anglo-Saxon type of consumer organization was a hastily 
organized and improvising movement that stood powerless in the face of 
organized business:
Consumer defense is a fashionable theme, which lends itself as a springboard 
for ambitious [individuals] or ideological interests [...]. When the individual acts 
as producer, he can focus his efforts on one particular issue. The same cannot 
be done when acting as consumer, who has to get involved in many different 
battles of which the outcome is uncertain.34
bttk made a sharp analysis of the situation, but then threw away the baby with 
the bathwater. Consumer defense was a difficult matter in 1962. However, that 
did not make it an inconsequential form of social mobilization for the future. 
The treatise on consumers and economic power in the bttk journal neglected 
the challenge that functional specialization posed for the unions. The interests 
of the consumer who was also a wage worker were potentially conflicting. 
Consumer movements were not interested in keeping companies afloat that 
produced an inferior product. Bad reviews in ta actually drove a lot of smaller 
Belgian companies into bankruptcy.35 During the eighties, ta moreover 
challenged the rights of public service employees to strike.36
A review of the first two terms of the Council shows that it never 
really became a powerful political arena for consumer interests. Producers 
and retailers easily dominated the other participants. The Council initially 
consisted of nine consumer representatives, three business representatives 
and four experts in distribution or product normalization.37 However, the 
last group tended to side with the producer interest rather consistently. The 
expertise of ta, ufidec, the Family League and the other women’s associations 
was moreover weak and disorganized compared to that of business, who 
sent out well-paid professional representatives. Divisiveness reigned in 
the consumer scene. Belgian politicians had recognized the two consumer 
34 De bediende: ledenblad Bond der Bedienden, Technici 
en Kaderleden (May 1962).
35 Interview Willy Van Rijckeghem by the author, 
2014.
36 Ghent University Archives (hereafter Ughent), 
Archives Willy Van Rijckeghem (hereafter wvr) 
127, Conseil du Consommation 3 December 
1980 and 120, board meeting ta, 3 June 1980, 28 
October 1980; Humo (September 1980).
37 Belgisch Staatsblad, 2 April 1964, article 3.
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movements strictu sensu as official consumer representatives, but they had also 
acknowledged the Christian-democratic and social-democratic co-operatives, 
the Family League, several women’s groups and the three major Belgian 
trade unions as such. Because the powerful trade unions did not commit to 
consumer politics, the Council never gained an authoritative position.
Consumer representatives could not agree on a joint program, even 
though they were paradoxically united in a European contact group for 
consumers. Their input in the Belgian Council was described by a social-
democrat as “neither active, competent nor coherent”.38 During the very first 
meeting of November 1964, the representative of the Federation of Industries 
attacked the “consumerist” discourse, arguing that producers and consumers 
had the same interests. He objected to the mere mention of the term 
“decision-making” in official records, but also to setting up subcommittees 
and to the possibility of making council reports public. These discussions all 
ended favourably for the Federation.39
On top of that, ta and (parts of) the social-democratic pillar grew 
increasingly hostile. With different ideologies being defended by rather 
intransigent personalities, the Belgian consumer movements never overcame 
their differences. ta’s anti-socialist director Gilbert Castelain scandalized the 
presence of the social-democratic co-operative more than he did that of the 
Belgian Federation of Industry. Meanwhile Roger Ramaekers, leader of the 
social-democratic co-operative and in control of the funding of the womens’ 
organizations, denounced ta’s “limited vision” and called them ordinary 
paper salesmen.40
The Council shows that those managing the welfare state during 
les trentes glorieuses recognized that they could not bypass this new interest 
group, but they were not prepared to fully include them. Economic growth 
was more important than a vocal consumer. In an age that coupled steady 
rises in purchasing power with a general optimism about the market, the 
disruptive potential of consumer movements was too limited to command 
real participation. One very important reason for this disconnect was the 
gender gap. During the sixties, organized consumerism was still considered 
something of a women’s concern. The Belgian government, an all-male 
bastion, did not consult a council dealing with the “soft” matters of household 
consumption to inform its overall macro-economic policy.41 That only 
changed when economic downturn occurred.
38 Amsab, sgc, 9577, Note de synthèse relative au 
fonctionnement du Conseil, 5 March 1969.
39 Amsab, sgc, 9580, council meeting November 
1964.
40 W. Van Rijckeghem, L’histoire de Test-Achats, 54 
and interview Castelain, 46 and 60.
41 ‘Le conseil n’a pas pu nouer avec le gouvernement 
des rapports qui [...] auraient permis de dégager des 
grandes lignes de la politique à suivre. Les quelques 
avis rendus par le conseil n’ont pas reçu l’audience 
qu’ils meritent’. Amsab, sgc, 9577, Note de 
synthèse rélative au fonctionnement du Conseil, 5 
March 1969.
the rise of consumer society
Energy crisis and the struggle for the crioc (1975-1981)
The oil crisis of 1973 shocked the Belgian economy. Paradoxically, this 
also engendered the break-through of consumerism in the political arena. 
Mounting inflation led the then minister of Economic Affairs Willy Claes, 
again a social-democrat, to start up the Mercator campaign. The campaign 
intended to make consumers aware of their economic influence.42 Claes 
was not convinced that the general rise in price levels was related only to 
the measures of the opec cartel.43 It was indeed not uncommon for Belgian 
producers to use any world crisis to speculate with resources and prices.44 
But Claes found only weak partners in the consumer movement and began to 
believe that defending consumers was essentially the role of the state.45
Measured by the number of participants who requested the ministerial 
brochure on consumer awareness, the Mercator campaign was a success. For 
the first time, Belgian business communities began to fear that consumers 
would find ‘a potent partner in the state’. This potential public-private 
nexus was such a shock that the business community openly questioned the 
legitimacy of doing comparative testing without ‘adequate’ supervising. 
The Federation of Belgian Industries expressed its hopes for an ‘organized 
dialogue’ between consumer movements and their partners, ‘the producers and 
retailers’.46
In reality, global business communities had no intention whatsoever 
to befriend the consumer movement. With the rise of Ralph Nader and the 
consolidation of several strong national consumer movements across Europe, 
organized consumerism left its noncommittal ‘toaster testing’ phase behind. 
More fundamental values, such as waste and equality, were now being debated 
in a context of global economic crisis.
Criticized both by business and public authorities, the Belgian 
consumer movements decided to take unanimous action. In 1974, ta, ufidec 
and the Family League held their first joint press conference. They asked for 
participation in the commission for Control on gas and electricity and the 
newly founded Commission for control on the petroleum sector. The energy 
crisis was advanced as a reason to adjust the tripartite nature of (parts of) 
social-economic concertation.47 And there were other new ideas. In April 
42 ‘Mouvements des consommateurs.’ crisp, 31 
(October 1975) 3.
43 H. Gaus (ed.) Politiek-biografisch lexicon van de 
Belgische Ministers en Staatssecretarissen, 1960-
1980 (Antwerpen 1989) 133.
44 National Archives and Records Administration 
Washington dc, Record Group 84, Foreign 
Service Posts, Belgian Embassy, 157, ‘hoarding in 
Belgium’, 17 July 1950.
45 ‘Mouvements des consommateurs.’ crisp, 31 
(October 1975) 3.
46 P. Van den Abeele, ‘Consumentenbeleid en 
consumentenonderzoek’, Tijdschrift voor 
Economie en Management 20:4 (1975) 515-522.
47 Ughent wvr, 27, Joint Press Conference April 
1974.
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1975, the consumer group within the Council for Consumer Affairs issued 
an advice on the institutional tools for consumer politics in Belgium. It 
mentioned a unified and powerful administration for consumer protection, 
an economic magistracy, a technical research institute and a consumer 
ombudsman, as in Sweden.48 Only one of these ambitious ideas would 
materialize during the seventies: the public institute for consumer affairs. But 
here again, ideological differences impacted the outcomes.
Public consumer institutions already existed in Northern Europe 
and France. Frans Van Mechelen, the influential president of the Family 
League who wanted more ambitious research on macro-economic policies 
for consumers, introduced the idea in Belgium. Van Mechelen also claimed 
that the energy crisis had made the consumer challenge insurmountable 
for private comparative testing organizations. Indoors, ta basically agreed 
with this analysis. In public however, it opposed such an institute because 
it could threaten their commercial survival.49 Seen from a zero-sum 
perspective, such public institutes could indeed be perceived as competitors. 
However, ta’s rejection of a public consumer institute was not based on 
evidence, but rather on an entrenched suspicion against public interference. 
ta ignored the fact that such centers could offer more sustained defense 
and information programs than they could, while also removing financial 
barriers to consumer education and perhaps strengthen the existing 
movements.50
ta’s connection to the Catholic establishment paid off when it began 
to lobby against a powerful public body for consumers. Gilbert Castelain 
(ta) recounted how his connections with minister André Oleffe (a Christian-
democrat) eventually led to a center that served not the consumer-citizen, but 
the organizations:
I didn’t like a [public] Center for Research and Information of the Consumer. 
And we in ta have done everything to make it into a Center for Research and 
Information of Consumer Organizations or crioc. The crioc could not directly 
address the consumer, being a publicly sponsored organism (sic), but it could 
address the public through the consumer movements.51
The Center for Research and Information for Consumer Organizations 
(hereafter crioc) was eventually inaugurated in 1975 with the goal to aid the 
consumer movements, promote the consumer interest and stimulate – but not 
take up – the defense of consumers. crioc’s board consisted of representatives 
of all consumer movements, including co-operative movements and trade 
48 ‘Mouvements des consommateurs.’ crisp 31 
(1975), 5.
49 Frans Van Mechelen, ‘Consumenteninstituut 
noodzakelijk’, De Standaard, June 5 1973.
50 Ibidem, 6 and ‘Mouvements des 
consommateurs.’ crisp 33 (1977) 4.
51 Interview Gilbert Castelain, 60.
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unions. It received a yearly subsidy by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, who 
also had one representative.52
crioc seems a successful example of a public-private mix for consumer 
welfare, perhaps even the typical result of the Belgian consociational 
democracy.53 In reality, its delicate position warranted a lot of internal conflict. 
Where did communication with the public begin? What did the different 
consumer movements really expect from crioc? The commercial interests of 
the existing consumer movements meant that crioc’s range of action, paid for 
by taxpayers’ money, was severely curbed.
crioc was thus not a success for consumers. In 1980, the socialist pillar 
pressed for a new structure for crioc, including a scientific coordinator and 
more comprehensive support to the consumer groups.54 ta was able to actually 
avert the reform. It also blocked a crioc publication on legal reform from the 
public. ta reported (internally) on crioc’s activities in the following vein:
1980 was a turbulent year as far as the crioc is concerned. Some have 
basically tried to overhaul its current structure in order to completely seize 
it. This manoeuver has failed: the current director remains employed, there 
will not be a scientific coordinator, the president of the board remains [...] 
a part-time controller and ad hoc study groups will continue to prepare 
and execute all research projects (in these groups we are present). Still, we 
remain convinced that some permanently try to turn crioc into a national 
Consumers’ Institute and use public money to make our life difficult. We are 
envied for our success.55
ta even requested a significant decrease in crioc’s budgets. This budget 
cut was ‘granted’ by the governments Martens v and vi (headed by Prime 
Minister Wilfried Martens) in 1982 as part of a broader turn toward 
neoliberal accents.
In the end, crioc played an important role in battling tobacco 
advertising. It also collected valuable studies and documentation for the 
consumer movements during the nineties. But these achievements stopped 
short of the ambitions expressed in the early seventies, when Van Mechelen 
and the social-democrats wanted to model crioc to the powerful Swedish 
Konsumentverket (Consumer Council). crioc had very little public renown 
and gained little relevance for policy makers. This outcome reflected not the 
52 crioc, Aktiviteiten verslag dienstjaar 1976 
(Brussels 1977) 5.
53 Considering that marketing specialist and retailers 
initially wanted to be included in the institute, 
crioc’s final design was indeed a modest success. 
See Van den Abeele, ‘Consumentenbeleid en 
consumentenonderzoek’, 522.
54 Amsab, Archives of the Cooperative Women, 144, 
meeting 3 March 1980.  
55 Ughent, wvr, 13, note of Counye on ta’s action 
repertoire, 1980.
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inherent weakness of the consumer interest, but the ideological choices and 
conflicts of certain consumer activists. ta depended on sales and therefore 
feared creating a competitor, even if this competitor had the public interest in 
mind.
Experiments and privatization (1971-1982): ta’s proposals for alternative social policies
After the golden sixties and with debates about the welfare state in full 
swing, the notion of the consumer interest had nonetheless become more 
disruptive. During a 1971 academic congress, several young economists 
had urged for more economic democracy by letting consumers and wage-
workers jointly determine the goals of production in a planned economy.56 
Ralph Nader’s visit to Belgium in 1973 was a widely mediatized event. 
The so-called countercultural critiques of May 1968 on the mass consumer 
society entered the mainstream as gloomy predictions on the economy 
became real after the oil crisis. Confronted with these challenges and in 
danger of losing their audience, comparative testing organizations had to 
re-invent themselves.
While non-interventionism had become the default position of the 
majority within ta’s board, certain board members of ta did offer some 
unconventional social policy measures. Especially Willy Van Rijckeghem, 
a professor in economics, self-proclaimed neo-Keynesian, president of the 
International Organization of Consumer Unions and participant in several 
development missions by international organizations (e.g. the International 
Labour Organization and the Inter-American Development Bank) played a 
key role in this creative turn. Two of ta’s proposals will be discussed in more 
detail: the basic needs economy and the idea of local consumer information 
centers.
These ideas had the potential of transforming consumer society, 
providing more collective forms of consumer protection. Their history 
presents a more balanced view of the postwar consumer movement and 
the challenges it faced. Although not every ta-member was a free-market 
fundamentalist, the ideology adopted by ta in the late fifties caused a 
deadlock during the seventies. ta co-opted more radical ideas, but was not 
powerful enough to bring them into practice. Its short-lived overture towards 
a more political path also illustrates the resilience of the organization.57 
During the same period, ufidec’s main focus was the same it had always been: 
food safety. While its work in this field was valuable, ufidec lost the battle 
56 ara, obap, 678 Tenth Flemish Scientific Economic 
Conference: business in the service of the 
consumer; De Standaard, 26 April 1971 and De 
Vlaamse Spektator, 24 April 1971.
57 There was resistance within ta’s board against 
participating in the public sphere with ‘political’ 
arguments. Ughent, wvr, 7, seminar 20 May 1974.
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for mediagenic performances. By the early eighties, the once powerful mass 
movement for female consumers had become a small player with a modest, 
almost unfashionable periodical.
Basic needs economy
In 1976, ta organized a conference on macro-economic policy starring its 
director Willy Van Rijckeghem. Van Rijckeghem held a plea for a national 
economy that catered to the basic needs of its citizens while procuring 
sustainable domestic employment at the same time.58 The plan showed 
similarities with the radical New Deal recipes advocated by Colston Warne, 
president of cu, during the thirties and late fourties.59 In this type of planned 
economy, consumer needs and production factors were matched more 
thoroughly.
Public health, public transport and housing were just a few of 
the sectors that Van Rijckeghem considered deficient, and in need of 
public investment. ta even temporarily renounced individual consumer 
sovereignty by suggesting that individual gains for the consumer (in the 
form of higher incomes) were not a priority. Instead, it suggested nudging 
demand towards sectors that created local employment and supported 
welfare state policies.60 Van Rijckeghem’s proposals, as advanced in name 
of ta, very much anticipated the future developments of the welfare state. 
Although Belgium had a decent model of social security in place since 
the late fourties, it was not necessarily able to deliver all citizens a decent 
standard of living. Health care was one example. For a country in which the 
public sphere was according to Van Rijckeghem ‘preoccupied with dieting’, 
Belgium had a remarkably high account of deficiency diseases among 
children, especially those of poor families.61 The health of the Belgian 
working-class population was consistently lower than that of its Western-
European neighbours. Van Rijckeghem thus urged for preventive, rather 
than curative health care. This even included better working conditions and 
less environmental pollution.
Housing was another field in which the consumer ideal did not 
necessarily match Belgian reality.62 The number of unsanitary homes had 
actually risen between 1961 and 1971. For almost a third of the Belgian 
population the ideal middle class home was unattainable. Four out of ten 
houses did not have an indoor toilet, half of all houses had neither a bath nor 
58 Le chomage: interpretations et stratégies face à la 
crise (Brussels 1978) 30 and Trends, 15 October 
1977.
59 New York Times, 8 February 1931.
60 Le chomage: interpretations et strategies, 44.
61 Le chomage: interpretations et strategies, 31.
62 P. De Decker ‘Dismantling or Pragmatic 
Adaptation? On the Restyling of Welfare and 
Housing Policies in Belgium’, International Journal 
of Housing Policy 4:3 (2001) 276.
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a shower and 75 percent lacked central electric heating in 1977.63 Belgian 
housing policy was an example of what sociologist Herman Deleeck had 
identified in 1975 as the Matthew effect. This means that social policy is 
designed in a non-inclusive way and hence benefits better-off groups more 
than weaker social groups. In practice, Belgium had not so much a housing 
policy as a policy of promoting home ownership while ignoring tenants. Van 
Rijckeghem hence advocated means-tested subsidies for home improvements. 
He also stressed the need for better education of the ‘often overlooked’ first-
generation immigrants, many of whom were illiterate.64 Finally, he urged 
governments to update their fiscal policy so that activities which fulfilled basic 
needs received more support than wasteful economic activities. One of the 
first examples he mentioned was recycling.
But who had to pay for such an ambitious project? To a limited extent, 
Van Rijckeghem wanted to nudge private capital into specific projects. To 
the dismay of insurance companies’ representatives, he counted on private 
savings and most of all on contributions from insurance companies. Yet the 
main source of funding lay elsewhere:
The rich Western countries [...] have obtained such a level of affluence that it 
becomes possible, if one really wishes it, to satisfy the fundamental needs of all 
individuals. But this would require a redistribution of the existing revenues which 
might encounter strong resistence. Without excluding such a redistribution, it 
seems nonetheless preferable to satisfy the fundamental choices by driving up the 
domestic product through a better utilization of underutilized means. A [...] solution 
which is no doubt more fundamental [than redistribution of the existing riches, gn], 
is the search for a new repartitition of the fruits of higher productivity.65
Van Rijckeghem wanted to reallocate future economic growth – as opposed to 
the ‘more radical’ solution of redistributing the existing wealth – by setting 
up a separate fund. The fund would be used to create jobs in the basic needs 
sectors he had identified. This plan owned something to the strategic social 
funds that were contemplated in Sweden around the same time by Gustav 
Meidner. The difference was that while Meidner specifically charged large 
companies and shareholders to line these public funds through a share levy66, 
Van Rijckeghem suggested that the employees and capital owners of the most 
productive sectors gave up some of their gains.
The logic behind Van Rijckeghem’s proposal is particularly interesting, 
as it illustrates ta’s somewhat hostile attitude towards trade unions. Van 
Rijckeghem equalled higher productivity with lower prices for the consumer. 
He then reified this rather simple and contemporary observation into an 
63 Le chomage: interpretations et strategies, 34.
64 Le chomage: interpretations et strategies, 35.
65 Le chomage: interpretations et strategies, 40-41.
66 R. Blackburn ‘Economic Democracy: Meaningful, 
Desirable, Feasible?’, Daedalus 136:3 (2007) 43.
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economic law; this certainly had to be the ‘normal situation’. Whether 
improving labour conditions, as he himself advocated, was compatible with 
cheaper products and services, remained unquestioned. Van Rijckeghem then 
stated that the Belgian model for social-economic concertation made the 
country deviate from this principle because increased productivity led not to 
lower consumer prices, but to higher wages. He claimed that the general wage 
rise of the past years did not necessarily coincide with increased productivity 
in specific sectors. Therefore – according to his analysis – the old system of 
concertation had to be completely readjusted. However, social-economic 
concertation was at the time a sectoral matter, rather than a national one. It 
was not necessarily true that less-productive workers received exaggerated 
wages because of the social-economic concertation. This argument on the 
warping effect of higher wages pertained to the discourse of employers.67
ta’s proposal for a basic needs economy was nonetheless an ambitious 
attempt to surpass both the free market and the traditional recipes of deficit 
spending. The plan was also a controversial solicitation of the consumer 
movement to join macro-economic planning.68 Van Rijckeghem’s consumerist 
proposals would have thoroughly modified the balance between capital and 
labour that had been negotiated in the Joint Declaration on Productivity (1954) 
and institutionalized within successive wage-bargaining rounds.69 Hence, the 
plan was never adopted. 
Local information centers
Around that same time, ta considered setting up local information centers for 
consumers. Similar initiatives had appeared in the United Kingdom, where small 
clubs of volunteers checked local prices, offered advice and denounced consumer 
scandals under the wings of the Consumer Association, another comparative 
testing organization.70 This was very much a matter of spontaneous community 
organizing. But faithful to the Belgian recipe of subsidized liberty and its own 
habit of keeping tight control, Belgian ta saw local centers as a way to strengthen 
its own enterprise with support of public funding.
ta set up its first information center – located in a large Brussels 
shopping mall – in 1976 with a promise for financial support from the 
Brussels municipal government.71 In Van Rijckeghem’s words, ‘specialized 
67 In itself, these rising wages do not explain the end 
of economic growth in the late seventies. See 
R. Savage, Economie Belge, 1953-2000: ruptures et 
mutations. (Louvain-La Neuve 2004) 34.
68 Trends, 1 November 1977.
69 D. Luyten, Sociaal-economisch overleg in België 
sedert 1918, 166-173.
70 This was the counterpart to the Dutch 
Consumentenbond, Belgian ta and American cu. 
See M. Hilton Consumerism in Twentieth-Century 
Britain. The Search for a Historical Movement. 
(Cambridge 2003) 213.
71 W. Van Rijckeghem, L’histoire de Test-Achats, 123.
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teams able to offer a wide range of services to the local communities, including 
advice on large purchases, budgetary planning and matters of housing’ were 
an indispensable part of the basic needs approach.72
This window of opportunity for ta was created by the reform of the 
local institutions for social assistance. A groundbreaking 1974 law redefined 
poverty aid as a right, rather than a favour. It led to an institutional reform of 
the local Commissions for Public Aid (the so-called coo’s) into Centres Publics 
d’Aide Sociale or cpas (legally in 1976, in practice only after 1978 after the fusion 
of municipalities). Theoretically, cpas were broader in nature.73 The welfare 
state had made the commitment to not only assist welfare recipients with money, 
but also to address the social and psychological dimensions of poverty. Social 
assistance now had to enable every citizen to live ‘in conditions conforming to 
human dignity’.74 Local authorities were faced with an imminent reform of 
which the limits and modalities were still unclear. They had to rethink the 
social services offered to their inhabitants. Although ta had stated in 1957 that 
the working-class was not its core audience, it now saw the benefits of offering 
‘community services’ rather than just publishing an expensive magazine.75 
Plans were made to set up at least ten new centers in Ghent, Antwerp, Bruges, 
Waver, Liège, Namur, Mons and Charleroi. In all cases, support from the cpas or 
city councils was vital for the financial survival of the project.76
During the preparatory phase, ta’s board discussed possible measures 
to make the centers accessible for a wide range of audiences. Staff members 
had to be higher educated, but preferably in the humanities. More than it had 
ever done before, ta wanted to attract public-minded individuals interested 
in human problems, rather than all-knowing technicians who judged 
commodities. ta was moreover acutely aware that high-profile university 
students might not be the best communicators towards ‘Monsieur et Madame tout 
le monde’. The centers should reach an audience that relied less frequently on the 
written word, as its director Castelain explained on tv.77 To avoid scaring less-
well-heeled housewives away, the centers would have specific opening hours, 
a display of household objects and a children’s corner. The board meetings 
stated a preference for female staff members – even though the televised 
72 Le Chomage: interpretations et strategies, 42.
73  J. Vranken ‘Het ocmw: dertig jaar onderweg naar 
een recht op maatschappelijke dienstverlening’, 
in: J. Vranken (ed.) Armoede en sociale uitsluiting. 
Jaarboek 2005 (Leuven 2005) 152-163.
74 M. Bouverne-De Bie ‘Laat ons de geschiedenis 
meenemen, 30 jaar ocmw’, ocmw-visie 6 (2007) 
8-13. This philosophy was somewhat adjusted in 
the 2002 law on Social Integration.
75 ta explicitly committed itself to serve only the 
‘intelligent middle class’ and the male ‘chef de 
famille’. Ughent, wvr, 111, Political charter of ta by 
Louis Darms (1958).
76 Ughent, wvr, 15, note sur l’état des pourparlers 
concernant l’ouverture d’autres centres 
d’informations (1979) and 123 Rapport sur le 
developpement des centres d’information (1981).
77 Televised coverage by the Belgian Public 
Broadcasting Company on ta’s information 
center on 22 January 1979, retrieved on  
http://oldportal.euscreen.eu (1 March 2015).
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coverage of their first center in Brussels featured a reassuring gentleman in a 
tidy suit.78 ta’s plan was to give consumers pre-shopping information (it even 
used the uncharacteristic term of ‘real needs’), legal advice and social-economic 
education. For those recently fired, those looking for the best conditions on a 
loan or for those duped consumers who wanted legal action, the centers had to 
give free guidance. An impressive brainstorm on possible activities took place 
within the board. In August, seminars on ‘social climbing through alternative 
forms of education’ were planned for college graduates who had failed their 
first term. For pensioners, guided tours in old-people’s homes were projected. 
Seminars on how to save energy were considered particularly topical.79 For 
children and families, there would be coloring games, quizzes and product 
demonstrations.80 The centerpiece of all these efforts was ta’s product database, 
which could be accessed freely in the center on a terminal. The Brussels center 
served as a test case for the whole endeavor. During its first year, it attracted the 
impressive number of 40,000 visitors.
Such consumerist local initiatives were popular among politicians as 
well. Municipalities such as Antwerp, Huy and Wilrijk already had council 
members who took up consumer affairs or developed collective action in 
this field.81 There were many more local politicians who looked favourably 
upon ta’s plans. But there were also adversaries. ta reported internally that a 
local tradesman, who happened to be a city council member, was ill-disposed 
towards their proposals because it could harm his own interests.82
But after two years of careful negotiation and planning, ta’s promising 
plans collapsed completely. One of the most conspicuous reasons for failure 
was that the staff member who managed the project, stole the cash register of 
the Brussels center and disappeared.83 After filing a complaint and sending 
out a new project manager, ta discovered that the enthusiasm of the local 
municipalities and cpas for co-founding consumer centers was more mooted 
than the employee had suggested. Funding from the Brussels city council 
actually never came through. ta could hence no longer afford an office in a 
popular shopping mall such as City 2. The Brussels information center was 
continued for one more year in ta’s own office. After 1981, it was replaced by 
telephone-based advice for paying subscribers only.
Why did local authorities promise support only to withdraw it once 
the plans became more concrete? Perhaps they had concluded that ta offered 
78 Ughent, wvr, 16, board meeting 25 September 
1978 and Note concernant les centre locaux des 
consommateurs (1978).
79 Ughent, wvr, 15, actions prévues à City 2 pour la fin 
de l’année 1979.
80 Ughent, wvr, 16, board meeting 25 September 
1978 and Note concernant les centre locaux des 
consommateurs (1978).
81 Ughent, wvr, 123 Rapport sur le developpement des 
centres d’information (1981) and M. Driesen Vivec, 
1959-1984, 118.
82 Ughent, wvr, 121, note au conseil du 3 mars 1980 
(centres locaux).
83 W. Van Rijckeghem, L’histoire de Test-Achats, 143.
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an uneven bargain, in which public authorities would have more burdens 
than benefits. The local centers would have been managed by ta but paid for 
by the public authorities, who thus had little control over the staff members. 
Total costs included staff, prestigious office space and a contractual payment 
of 50,000 Belgian Francs each year for ta’s services as a private subcontractor 
to public welfare.84 ta never completely forgot its own objective, which was 
first and foremost expanding its customer database. Board meetings spoke of 
the centers as places for data-mining. Visitors were given free information but 
then convinced to subscribe to ta.85 Incidentally, a lack of new subscriptions 
was the main reason for relinquishing the Brussels experiment.86
In ta‘s philosophy, the considerable savings individuals could make by 
reading the magazine compensated subscription costs.87 But this assumption 
surely did not apply to every consumer. Lacking any experience in social 
work, ta was moreover not prepared for the multidimensional nature of 
social exclusion and poverty, which the cpas had to remedy. In their insistence 
on popular shopping quarters, they showed little understanding of the 
geography of poverty. Finally, most questions handled in the Brussels center 
dealt with notarial advice and expensive household durables. The information 
centers had a middle-class bias.88
The projected cooperation between private and public actors showed 
other salient features. Informal contacts between ta’s board members and 
local politicians served to set up the first plans for local centers. Contingency 
and mutual understanding thus became more important than a reasoned, 
well-designed set-up of information centers in locations that really needed 
consumer advice. Since ta’s board members were already quite well-heeled, 
the plans could reinforce the inequality between local communities, which 
was the major unresolved problems of the reform of the cpas.89 Matters 
of accountability to the public were nowhere mentioned in ta’s euphoric, 
but rather superficial project notes on the centers. ta also had a history of 
holding tight control and allowing little participation when it teamed up with 
84 In these days, the Belgian federal government 
paid a substantial part of the wages to companies 
that absorbed part of the massive youth 
unemployment. Such employees were known as 
‘Bijzonder Tijdelijk Kader’. Ughent, wvr, 15, board 
meeting 21 November 1978.
85 W. Van Rijckeghem, L’histoire de Test-achats, 123.
86 W. Van Rijckeghem, Ibid., 143.
87 Interview Ivo Mechels of ta by the author, 2013.
88 Questions posed by the visitors to City 2 involved 
mainly purchasing advice (40%), judicial advice 
(40%) and ‘social’ questions (8–10%). Ughent, 
wvr, 15, board meeting of ta, 23 January 1979 and 
20 March 1979.
89 Ughent, wvr, 15, board meeting of ta, 21 
November 1978: ‘dans l’objectif du financement 
des centres d’information locaux, Yves 
Génin demande aux membres du conseil 
leur intervention éventuelle auprès des 
administrations communales de couleur 
politique variée, où ils auraient quelque 
influence’.
the rise of consumer society
partners.90 But as the history of their own unscrupulous project manager 
showed, employees with the skills, experience or ethics to deal with the task at 
hand were an invaluable asset. ta’s plans for information centers had design 
flaws that could have made them another prime example of a Matthew’s 
effect: a policy that benefitted those who least needed it.
As this grassroots approach to expansion was dwarfed, ta identified 
two alternative strategies to grow. The first was getting more media attention 
by taking up the role of assertive watchdog. Once ufidec disappeared, ta 
approached this job with even more professional commitment. The second 
strategy was offering an insurance policy to its paying members.91 This 
included a hotline for questions, legal advice on demand and cheaper tariffs 
for certain services. By building this private ombuds service for subscribers 
only, the privatization of consumer assistance took a decisive turn. Unlike in 
e.g. Germany or Puerto Rico, plans for a publically paid and easily accessible 
service for consumers were never again made in Belgium.92
Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that consumer movements were initially referred 
to the margins of the welfare state, as unsuccessful players in a consultative 
council. Consumer movements were not able to revert the focus on economic 
growth and full employment policies into one on increased consumer welfare. 
Like the trade unions, they missed a historical opportunity to overcome the 
compartmentalization of citizen’s interests.
While the economic crisis of the seventies provided an opportunity 
to tie the consumer interest to the welfare state more closely, the outcome (an 
amputated public center known as crioc) was less than optimal. As the most 
dynamic Belgian consumer movement, ta played a very important role in the 
final outcome of the negotiations, in which its specific ideological agenda and 
its commercial model took prominence. Yet these features simultaneously 
jeopardized ta’s position as contractors of even more public social welfare. 
Their plans for local information centers were fraught between opposing logics.
The Keynesian welfare state increasingly took the character of a service 
provider, rather than a powerful broker between labor and capital. Consumer 
movements reflected the same evolution. Despite delivering some very 
original ideas on social policy and slowly constructing consumerist awareness 
among the general population, consumer movements have not dealt with 
90 J. Steif ‘L’information comme mode d’action 
des organisations de consommateurs’ Revue 
Française de Sociologie, 18:1 (1977) 103-106 and 
Larousse Journal de l’année 1975 (consummation-
protection).
91 W. Van Rijckeghem, L’histoire de Test-Achats, 158.
92 After the dissolution of crioc in 2015, plans were 
made to start up such a general ombudsservice at 
the federal level. The result has actually not been 
an ombudsservice, but rather a hotline.
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issues of social stratification or the limits of the commodification process. For 
private and public actors alike, these challenges remain out in the open.
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